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Appellant Keith W. Bourgeous, through his counsel of record, submits this Reply 
Brief in Support of his Appeal. 
A. THE DEPARTMENTS DENIAL OF BOURGEOUS' APPLICATION 
VIOLATED U.C.A. S68-3-5. 
Appellee, the Utah Department of Commerce, makes four arguments against any 
violation ofU.C.A. §68-3-5, which can be summarized as: (1) the statute does not apply 
to educational requirements; (2) the statute can only apply to a license and Bourgeous 
had not yet received a license; (3) the statute does not apply if the State Legislature 
changes laws which may cause a person to lose his license after he has qualified under 
Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County. 51 P.2d 645 (Utah 1935); and (4) the 
Department was given rule-making authority to determine educational requirements 
retroactively, which authority is outside of the purview of §68-3-5. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 
10-14). Each of the Department's arguments fails and should be rejected by this Court. 
First, U.C.A. §68-3-5 provides that "rights", "duties" and "penalties", as well as 
"actions or proceedings" that are "commenced under or by virtue" of a statute which is 
subsequently repealed shall not be affected by such repeal. The Engineer-in-Training 
Certificate which Bourgeous received in 1989 was statutorily provided for under the then 
applicable statute (U.C.A. §58-22-5, 1986), which stated among other things that the 
certification for an Engineer-in-Training would be granted if the applicant had graduated 
"from an engineering curriculum of four years or more approved by the board as being of 
satisfactory standing". (See copy of the 1986 statute at Exhibit "A" to Bourgeous* 
Opening Brief). Bourgeous1 TAC engineering degree was approved by the Board before 
§58-22-5 (1986) was repealed. In 1992, U.C.A. §58-22-5 was repealed and replaced 
with a new statute entitled "Qualifications for Licensure". The 1992 Act provided that: 
(9) After July 1, 1996, an individual who has 
graduated from an approved TAC/ABET accredited 
engineering technology curriculum shall be required to 
complete the educational requirements of an EAC/ABET 
accredited engineering curriculum in order to complete the 
educational requirements for a license as a professional 
engineer. 
As stated by the 1992 statute, the change that a TAC accredited degree would no 
longer be acceptable for licensure was not to take effect until July 1, 1996. However, 
prior to July 1, 1996, this statute was also repealed by Senate Bill 0235, the current 
version of the Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors Licensing Act. 
The current version of the Act became effective July 1, 1996 and included the stated 
purpose of amending the 1994 version to change the "qualifications for licensure." (See 
Preamble, S.B. 0235, attached as Addendum E to Appellant's Opening Brief). One of the 
changes in qualifications was to remove the EAC degree-only requirement. 
Nothing in U.C.A. §68-3-5 limits its application to only "licenses" and not 
certificates. Rather, the statute applies to rights, duties, penalties, actions and 
proceedings "commenced under or by virtue of the statute repealed." Thus, the 
Department's argument that U.C.A. §68-3-5 does not apply to educational qualifications 
approved and recognized by statute fails. Bourgeous' Engineer-in-Training Certificate 
was a statutorily created right which had accrued in 1989 with his receipt of the 
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Certificate. While the 1992 version ofU.C.A. §58-22-5 did expressly state that after July 
1, 1996, a TAC accredited degree would no longer be acceptable for licensure and 
thereby comported with the requirements ofU.C.A. §68-3-3 that the retroactive effect be 
expressly declared1, this statute never went in effect. Other than providing insight to the 
Legislature's intent with the current law in continuing to recognize TAC degrees as 
before, the 1992 version never became effective and thereby does not support the 
Department's claims. 
The Department's second argument that §68-3-5 only applies to licenses fails as 
well because the express language of the statute imposes no such limitation as the 
Department suggests. 
The Department next claims that under Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake 
County, 51 P.2d 645 (Utah 1935), the Legislature had the right to "change one of the 
requirements for licensure before Bourgeous was licensed and before he had fulfilled all 
of the requirements, especially after four years notice was given." (Department's Brief, p. 
12). The Riggins case concerned various challenges to the constitutionality of the Liquor 
Control Act which affected at least one of the challenging party's liquor licenses by 
'Subsection 9 ofU.C.A. §58-22-5 (1992), stated: 
After July 1, 1996, an individual who has graduated from an 
approved TAC/ABET accredited engineering technology 
curriculum shall be required to complete the educational 
requirements of an EAC/ABET accredited engineering 
curriculum in order to complete the educational requirements 
for a license as a professional engineer. 
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restricting the number of licenses to one per five hundred persons within a city. The 
Utah Supreme Court quoted from Corpus Juris and other authorities that a license is not a 
contract or permanent right and "that free latitude is reserved by the Legislature to 
impose new or additional burdens on the licensee, or to alter the license, or to revoke it or 
annul it." (51 P.2d at 658). In rejecting the Appellants' constitutional challenges, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: "It was competent for the Legislature under its police power 
to nullify the licenses theretofore issued." (Id.) 
In the case at bar, Bourgeous is not challenging the constitutionality of §58-2, nor 
is Bourgeous contesting the State Legislature's authority to enact the 1992 Act (which 
would have expressly made Bourgeous' degree inadequate after July 1, 1996). 
Bourgeous is challenging the Department's misinterpretation of the current Act. 
Moreover, this case is not about the State Legislature revoking licenses of any engineer 
who was educated at Weber State instead of the University of Utah. Rather, this case is 
about the Department's attempt to retroactively affect Bourgeous' Engineer-in-Training 
Certificate (a right) when the statute (the 1996 and current version of the Act) did not 
reflect any intent by the State Legislature to do so. Without a pronouncement in the 
current Act that existing Engineer-in-Training Certificates were nullified after July 1, 
1996 (as was done in the 1992 version which never took effect), the Section 68-3-5 
protections apply to Bourgeous' Certificate and the Department cannot affect such right 
directly or indirectly. 
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In the related case of Cache County, et al. v. Property Tax Division, State of Utah, 
922 P.2d 758 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court rejected the Tax Commission's effort 
to make a similar mistake. In that case, Cache County had entered into a Contingent Fee 
Agreement with a third party to assess property. At the time of the agreement there was 
no law which prohibited such agreements. Thereafter, U.C.A. §58-2-703(2)(c) became 
effective which prohibited such contingent fee agreements. The Utah Supreme Court 
acknowledged that §68-3-3 codified the "long-standing rule of statutory construction that 
a legislative enactment which alters the substantive law or affects vested rights will not 
be read to operate retrospectively unless the Legislature has clearly expressed that 
intention." 922 P.2d 758, 767 (Utah 1996). In concluding that §58-2-703(2)(c) 
contained no language reflecting any intent that the subsection should be applied 
retroactively, the Supreme Court concluded that the Legislature had no such intent and 
held that the Tax Commission had erroneously applied the section. (Id.) The Contingent 
Fee contract was held to be valid through its remaining term in spite of §58-2-703(2)(c). 
This Court should hold that Bourgeous' Certificate remained valid through the time of his 
application as well. 
The Department's final argument is that once the Legislature gave the Department 
authority in 1996 to establish by rule the criteria for acceptable "Bachelor's or Master's 
Degree from an Engineering Program" (U.C.A. §58-22-302(1 )(d)), the Department had 
authority to impose such criteria both prospectively and retroactively. Thus, the 
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Department argues that it can circumvent the protections ofU.C.A. §68-3-5 even though 
the State Legislature could not. It is axiomatic that the Department cannot do something 
which the Legislature is prohibited from doing by statute. The Department's authority is 
derived from that given to it by the State Legislature. Alpine School Dist. Board v. State 
Tax Comm., 14 P.3d 125 (Ut. App. 2000) (agency's authority is not unfettered and only 
includes power conferred by the statute). Such authority cannot exceed the State 
Legislature's authority. Moreover, the legislative intent of the Act is derived from the 
plain meaning of the statute, not from the Department's unauthorized efforts to expand 
and overreach the authority delegated under U.C.A. §58-22-302. Even if this Court 
agrees with the Department and rules that the Act authorizes the Department to exclude 
TAC degrees for licensure after July 1, 1996, such a ruling should not apply retroactively 
to Bourgeous without the Legislature so stating. Such was this Court's ruling in Fussell 
v. Department of Commerce, 815 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1991), where the educational 
statute for psychologists "was replaced with a stricter statutory education requirement" 
after Dr. Fussell had applied. Yet, consistent with U.C.A, §68-3-5, this Court applied the 
older statute because there was no expression from the Legislature that the stricter law be 
applied retroactively. 815 P.2d at 251, FN 3. 
In its misguided effort to expand its authority even beyond the limits of Section 
68-3-5, the Department cites to the repealed language of 1992 version to show "very 
clearly that the Legislature intended that the new educational requirements for licensure 
6 
be an EAC/ABET degree . . . " (Departments Brief at p. 23). As discussed above, the 
1992 version and this language requiring only EAC degrees never went into effect. It 
was repealed by the current statute before July 1, 1996, which removed the very language 
the Department wishes this Court to rely upon. The Department next argues that it is 
flawed logic to reply upon Section 306 of the current Act to take a FE Examination with 
a TAC degree only to find out later that the applicant would be required to have an EAC 
degree. (Department's Brief at p.24). The Department argues that from 1992 to 1996 
Appellant Bourgeous knew that the change was about to occur and therefore cannot 
claim that he misunderstood the change. The record clearly shows that there was no 
issue of fact as to what Bourgeous knew. Bourgeous understood that he had fulfilled the 
educational requirements upon the receipt of his Engineer-in-Training Certificate and 
that the changes proposed under the 1992 statute (which never went into effect) did not 
change the PPE Examination nor the work experience requirements after July 1, 1996, 
which were the only requirements Bourgeous had left to complete for licensure. 
Instead, Bourgeous1 argument went to new applicants who read the 1996 Act 
(after July 1, 1996) and observe that a TAC/ABET degree is acceptable for taking the FE 
Examination. Then, such applicant (after taking the FE Examination) finding out later 
that the Department's interpretation is contrary to the 1996 Act and that such applicant 
now is required to return to school and get a second engineering degree from a EAC 
accredited school before being permitted to take the PPE Examination and receive a 
7 
license. While this was what the Legislature intended with the 1992 Act, that Act never 
went into effect and was repealed. Under the current Act, the Legislature does intend an 
applicant obtain two engineering degrees from separate universities to meet the 
educational requirements for licensure. The provision was repealed before it became 
effective and this Court should stop the Department's efforts to the contrary. 
B. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN 
ITS TREATMENT OF BOURGEOUS' AND HUNTERfS APPLICATIONS. 
The Department admits that it cited the wrong reason for granting Hunter his 
license. (Appellant's Brief, p. 15). The Department has never corrected its admitted 
error with Mr. Hunter. Moreover, the Department never discloses in this case what the 
right reasons were for granting Mr. Hunter a license. Instead, the Department makes a 
meaningless criticism of typographical error in Bourgeous1 brief. Page 25 of Bourgeous' 
opening brief presented a chart which compared Mr. Hunter to Bourgeous. The 
Department claims that the "chart" is in error and that this "is a major error and is focal 
point in this case." (Department's Brief, p. 18). The Department claims that the error is 
on the second line in stating that Hunter and Bourgeous passed "the (PPE) exam prior to 
July 1, 1996." Even the Department has misquoted the typographical error. What the 
chart actually states on the second line is that both Hunter and Bourgeous passed the "PE 
Exam". PE should have been FE for Fundamentals of Engineering Examination. This 
8 
typographical error does not absolve the Department's arbitrary and capricious conduct. 
The chart should have read as follows: 
Hunter Bourgeous 
TAC Degree Received June 1987 July 1989 
Passed PFE Exam October 1994 October 1989 
EIT Received (Never applied) October 1989 
Effective Date of § 55-22 July 1, 1996 
Passed PPE Exam October 1996 April 1997 
Application February 1997 September 1997 
Application Denied March 1997 September 1997 
Agency Review Requested April 1997 October 1997 
Licensed Granted April 1997 — 
The Department wishes to focus on when Hunter first sat for the PPE examination 
and not when he made his application. The Department argues that "had Hunter's exam 
been correctly scored in the first place, he would have had more than two months to 
apply for licensure under the pre-July 1, 1996 requirements." (Id. at p. 15). The 
Department argues that Hunter applied within two months after receiving a passing 
score. The Department also claims that Hunter had completed all of the requirements for 
licensure before July 1, 1996 (Department's Brief at p. 17). 
The record proves otherwise. It was over four months after Hunter's test was re-
scored (R-356) that he applied for licensure, in February of 1997, and over eight months 
after the July 1, 1996 deadline. The Department ignores the record on this delay and 
makes no finding that a 4lA month delay by Hunter was the "right" reason. Because the 
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Department allowed Hunter AVi months after he received his corrected score to file (and 
8 months after the July 1,1996 deadline), the Department was capricious in not allowing 
Bourgeous another 7 months (from February 1997 to September 1997) in making his 
application so that Bourgeous could complete the experience requirement. Moreover, 
most of Mr. Hunter's verifications of experience by supervising engineers were dated in 
1997 (R-358; 360; 362; 364; 366; 368; 370; 374; and 376), also over six months after the 
July 1, 1996 deadline. Thus, the record shows that Hunter did not complete the 
experience requirement and other requirements before July 1, 1996. To the extent that 
this Court accepts the Department's speculative argument regarding Hunter (he could 
have applied earlier if he had passed the test), it should give equal weight to Bourgeous' 
argument: Bourgeous understood that he had ten years to complete the work experience 
and final PPE examination from the date he received his Engineer-in-Training Certificate 
(R-231-232). Had Bourgeous been able to obtain one hundred percent of qualifying time 
by his employer (Phillips Petroleum), he could have completed the work experience 
requirements before the July 1, 1996 deadline. Moreover, Bourgeous' Engineer-in-
Training Certificate (created by statute) was good for 10 years under the Department's 
own regulation (which Bourgeous understood at the time he started with Phillips), giving 
Bourgeous until 1999 to complete the work experience, which he did complete by 1997, 
two years early. Therefore, the Department's rationale for treating Hunter and Bourgeous 
differently fails and the Department has violated in its duty by acting arbitrarily and 
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capriciously by denying Bourgeous1 application and granting Hunter's 1997 application 
for licensure. 
C. THE DEPARTMENT HAS VIOLATED RULE 24 OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE BY PRESENTING EVIDENCE NOT 
PART OF THE RECORD. 
Addendums E and J of the Department's Brief enclose survey information which 
were not part of the record before the trial court. This Court need not and should not 
consider any facts not properly cited to or supported by the record. Uckerman v. Lincoln 
Nat. Life Ins. Co.. 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978). Not only should this Court reject the 
Department's improperly filed documents, but this Court should ignore the Department's 
arguments on pages 26-28 of its brief which rely upon the improperly submitted 
evidence. Even if the Department had presented this new evidence to the trial court, it 
would not have refuted the fact that the Department's interpretation that a TAC degree is 
adequate for taking the FE exam but not the PPE is unique and contrary to all other 
jurisdictions. See pages 34-35 of Bourgeous' opening brief. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's order upholding the Department's and 
DOPL's denial of Bourgeous' application for licensure. The Department has attempted to 
violate U.C.A. §68-3-3 and 5 by eliminating the statutorily awarded Engineer-in-
Training Certificate to Bourgeous. The Department has also treated Bourgeous in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner and differently than a similarly-situated applicant, John 
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Hunter. Finally, the Department has acted inconsistent with and contrary to the authority 
and legislative intent of the Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors 
Licensing Act of 1996. Because Bourgeous has completed all of the requirements and 
passed all of the examination, he should be awarded his Professional Engineer's License. 
Bourgeous respectfully requests that this Court reverse the lower court's denial of 
his license, order the Department to grant him a Professional Engineer's License, and 
award him costs against the Department pursuant to Rule 34(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Affh 
Respectfully submitted this #&_ day of July, 2001. 
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